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SEPARATION OF POWERS

SEPARATION OF POWERS*
FRED L. Foxt

Many great political philosophers discussed the theory of Separation of Powers prior to the American Revolution; but it is perhaps
best expressed in the writings of Montesquieu in his great philosophical work called "Spirit of Laws," which was published about the middle of the eighteenth century, and was well known to students of history
in this country when the Revolution came on. Every government then
existing in the world was more or less autocratic except in England,
where Parliament had become supreme, though not at that time (before the Reform Bills of 1832 and 1867) representative of the people.
However, the democratic movement was progressing, particularly in
France. Political philosophers, while favoring some form of democracy,
felt that even such a form of government could be used to create tyranny; and to prevent such result they developed the idea of a government
with three separate and distinct branches, each independent of, and
acting as a check on, the others. It was always known that if the people
were to be represented in their views and aspirations, there must be
the legislative body; that if the legislative body enacted laws, there
must be some power set up to enforce them, calling for an executive
department; and then, finally, it was recognized that disputes would
arise as to what was the law and what was not the law and how laws
should be applied, and the necessity for a judicial department became
clearly apparent.
With these ideas controlling, the framers of our Federal Constitution, in the delegation of powers by the states to the Federal Government, set up a system under which there was created the legislative, executive and judicial branches of our government. There is noihing in
the Constitution which particularly stresses the independence of one
from the other; but, that was then, and has always been, understood
to be implied from the provisions of the Constitution itself. The Constitution provides for the creation of the legislative branch, with strictly defined powers; it creates an executive department with limited
*An address delivered before the Howard-Rogers Legal Society, composed of
students in the School of Law from West Virginia. With Judge Fox's permission,
the footnotes were compiled by MR. LLOYD R. KUHN, a member of the Board of Student Editors.
ijudge, Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia.
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powers, and, to a certain extent, with power to restrain legislative action, because the executive may veto a legislative act of the Congress,
which veto can be only overturned by a two-thirds majority vote; and
then the judicial department is created in very simple language. Judicial power had developed under the common law and had a welldefined and accepted meaning, as did both the legislative and executive powers. Therefore, there did not seem to be any necessity for detailed designation of the powers of the several departments.
The important thing was that under the federal system these powers should be treated as exclusive to each department, except in those
special instances where they supplemented each other. There was
never any doubt that when the Constitution conferred powers on a
particular department, such authority amounted to a limitation on
the exercise of any other power, unless required by necessary implication. This is clearly held in Marbury v. Madison'. It will be remembered that in that case the decision turned on whether the Supreme
Court of the United States, under the Constitution, had original jurisdiction in mandamus.
The Constitution of the United States provides that the Supreme
Court shall have original jurisdiction in all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls, and those in which a state
be a party, and that in all other cases the Supreme Court shall have
appellate jurisdiction2 . Congress conferred upon the Supreme Court
original jurisdiction in mandamus, and that act was held unconstitutional. In Scott v. Sandford,3 it was held that "neither the legislative,
executive, nor judicial Departments of the Government can lawfully
exercise any authority beyond the limits marked out by the Constitution." In 1881, in the famous case of Kilbourn v. Thompson,4 Justice
Miller, one of the ablest men who ever sat on the Supreme Court of
the United States, in discussing separation of powers, said: "It is believed to be one of the chief merits of the American system of written
constitutional law, that all the powers intrusted to Government,
whether State or national, are divided into the three grand departments, the executive, the legislative, and the judicial. That the functions appropriate to each of these branches of government shall be
vested in a separate body of public servants, and-that the perfection of
1i Cr. 137, 2 L. ed. 6o (18o3).
2U. S. Const. Art. III, § 2.
8ig How. 393, 401, 15 L. ed. 691, 699 (1857).
'103 U. S. z68, 9o-191, 26 L. ed. 377, 387 (1881).
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the system Tequires that the lines which separate and divide these departments shall be broadly and clearly defined. It is also essential to the
successful working of this system that the persons intrusted with power
in any one of these branches shall not be permitted to encroach upon
the powers confided to the others, but that each shall by the law of its
creation be limited to the exercise of the power appropriate to its own
department and no other. To these general propositions there are in
the Constitution of the United States some important exceptions. One
of these is, that the President is so far made a part of the legislative
power, that his assent is required to the enactment of all statutes and
resolutions of Congress."
Justice Miller then goes on to discuss further the proposition, and
ends with this warning: "It may be said that these are truisms which
need no repetition here to give them force. But while the experience
of almost a century has in general shown a wise and commendable
forbearance in each of these branches from encroachments upon the
others, it is not to be denied that such attempts have been made, and
it is believed not always without success. The increase in the number
of States, in their population and wealth, and in the amount of power,
if not in its nature to be exercised by the Federal government, presents powerful and growing temptations to those to whom that exercise is intrusted, to overstep the just boundaries of their own department, and enter upon the domain of one of the others, or to assume
powers not intrusted to either of them." 5 This warning is of particular
significance in these later days.
It cannot be doubted that the framers of our Federal Constitution
intended a dear separation of the powers of the three branches of the
government; but I think they were somewhat at a loss to determine
just how that particular theory of government should be enforced.
Fortunately for the country, there was an early settlement of that question in the famous case of Marbury v. Madison.6 President Jeffersoii,
acting through Secretary of State Madison, had withheld delivery of
the commissions of several Justices of the Peace who had been appointed by Jefferson's predecessor, John Adams. The appointees, acting under a Congressional Act purporting to give the Supreme Court of
the United States original jurisdiction in mandamus, petitioned the
Court for such a writ. The Court refused the writ, holding that the
statute was an unconstitutional attempt to enlarge the original juris5

Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U. S. M68, 191-192, 26 L. ed. 377, 387 (1881).
Gi Cr. 137, 2 L. ed. 60 (18o3).
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riction of the Supreme Court beyond the limits set out in-Article III
of the Constitution. By this method was determined for the first time
by the Supreme Court of the United States the question of its power to
declare unconstitutional an act of Congress; and, so far as any one can
foresee, it has been settled for all time. It is now an accepted theory, in
both the federal and state judiciary systems, that judicial power includes the power to declare unconstitutional an act of Congress or of
a state legislature, and to declare such an act void if contrary to the
terms of the Constitution. This power, however, is circumscribed by
the self-imposed limitation that a court will not declare an act of Congress or of a state legislature unconstitutional unless it is clearly so,
and, as has been held, beyond reasonable doubt.
Thus it is that the courts have taken unto themselves, without any
express constitutional provision in either the Federal or State Constitutions, the power to impose the separation of powers as the framers
of our Constitution intended. If there is any laxity in the enforcement
of this principle of government, it must rest squarely upon the judiciary,
because it possesses the power to maintain its right to enforce the separation of powers. I do not think it possesses a more wholesome power,
nor one which it should more zealously preserve and use.
I have discussed the theory of the separation of powers from the
standpoint of the Federal Government. Vrginia, from which we in
West Virginia get the fundamentals of our laws, has a splendid record
on this point; and that record, I think, has been preserved by her offspring to the west.
The first Constitution of Virginia, adopted June 29, 1776, eleven
years before the Federal Constitution was framed, provided: "The
Legislative, Executive and Judiciary departments shall be separate and
distinct, so that neither exercise the powers properly belonging to the
other; nor shall any person exercise the powers of more than one of
them at the same time, except that the justices of the county courts
shall be eligible to either House of Assembly." The Virginia Constitutions of 1829 and 1851 contained identical provisions, and the principle is preserved in the Constitution of 19o2.7
When West Virginia was formed in 1863, and adopted a Constitution, it contained this provision: "The Legislative, Executive, and
Judicial Departments of the Government shall be separate and distinct. Neither shall exercise the powers properly belonging to either of
the others. No person shall be invested with or exercise the powers of
Wa. Const. (1902) Art. III, § 39.
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more than one of them at the same time." And our present Constitution includes a provision which is virtually identical to the abovequoted section of the present Virginia Constitution.8
Thus, for more than one hundred and seventy years, Virginians
have held to the theory of the separation of powers, expressly provided
for in their several Constitutions. But as Justice Miller warned in 1881,
conditions have changed, and attacks have from time to time been
made upon this principle. We have been rather steadfast in West Virginia, but, on occasion, we have slipped. For example, for a long time
we have had a statute in West Virginia authorizing the incorporation
of communities of two thousand population and less as municipal corporations, upon a vote of the people, the incorporation to be approved
by the circuit court of the county in which the community proposed
to be incorporated is located.9 In 1894, in the case of In Re Town of
Union Mines,'0 this act of the legislature was held constitutional, the
Court holding that the said act, in so far as it conferred on the circuit
court functions in their nature judicial and administrative, although in
furtherance of the legislative department of the state government, was
constitutional and valid. At the same time the court refused to grant
an appeal or writ of error-, because it said that the circuit court, in discharge of this function, acted as a subordinate of the legislature and
was not subject to the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of
Appeals of the state." In discussing the case, Judge Dent said: "In dis'W.Va. Const. (1872) Art. V.
OW. Va. Stat. (1868) c. 47, § 92039 W. Va. 179, 19 S. E. 398 (1894).

2iContrary to the West Virginia rule, it is generally held that the creation, enlargement or diminution of municipal corporations is a legislative function, and
that any statute attempting to delegate this function to the uncontrolled discretion
of a court violates the provision of the applicable state constitution separating the
powers of the government into legislative, executive and judicial departments. 11
Am. Jur., Constitutional Law § 227; 37 Am. Jur., Municipal Corporations § 8; Note
(1930) 69 A. L. R. 266, 267.
In several jurisdictions, statutes purporting to vest in the courts the power to
approve incorporation of municipalities, similar to that involved in the Town of
Union Mines case, have been struck down as violating the separation of powers
doctrine. State ex rel. Luly v. Simons, 32 Minn. 540, 21 N. W. 750 (1884); Territory
ex rel. Kelly v. Stewart, i Wash. St. 98, 23 Pac. 4o5, 8 L. R. A. 1o6 (i8go); In re Village of North Milwaukee, 93 Wis. 616, 67 N. W. 1033, 33 L. R. A. 638 (1896). The
reasoning of these cases is best expressed as follows: "... the act of determining,
either tentatively or finally, whether it is for the best interest of the people that
they should be incorporated into a village, and fixing the boundaries, is not the
determination of a mere question of fact, but is the exercise of legislative discretion,
and, if such power be delegated at all, it must be delegated to the proper bodies
named in the constitution." In re Village of North Milwaukee, 93 Wis. 616, 67 N.
W. 1033, 1037, 33 L. R. A. 638, 642 (1896).
In a similar vein, acts conferring on the courts power to change the boundaries
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of municipal bodies by annexing or disconnecting territory have been struck down
as unconstitutional delegation of legislative power. "Whether cities, towns or villages should be incorporated, and, if incorporated, whether enlarged or contracted
in their boundaries, presents no question of law or fact for judicial determination.
It is purely a question of policy, to be determined by the legislative department."
City of Galesburg v. Hawkinson, 75 Ill. 152, 157 (1874). Accord: In re Village of
Ridgefield Park, 54 N. J. L. 288, 23 Ad. 674 (1892). The Galesburg decision has
been limited by a subsequent Illinois decision upholding an act authorizing the
court to disconnect territory only after finding designated statutory facts, the supreme court holding that the court without exercising any discretion determines
only the statute's execution. Punke v. Village of Elliott, 364 Ill. 604, 5 N. E. (2d)
389 (1936). In Nebraska and North Dakota, statutes authorizing the courts on appeal from the action of the city council to issue orders disconnecting from municipalities land coming within certain descriptions if the petition ought to be granted
and could be granted without injustice to the inhabitants have been declared unconstitutional delegations of legislative functions. Winkler v. City of Hastings, 85
Neb. 212, 122 N. W. 858 (19o9); Glaspell v. City of Jamestown, ii N. D. 86, 88 N. W.
io23 (1go2). A statute allowing the court to consider the advisability of making annexation and to issue an order of annexation if it is to the municipality's best interest is a void delegation of legislative authority. Udall v. Severn, 52 Ariz. 65, 79 P.
(2d) 347 (1938); In re Ruland, 120 Kan. 42, 242 Pac. 456 (1926).
However, the Supreme Court of the United States has decided that there is no
Federal Constitutional objection if a state legislature sees fit to give full jurisdiction
over such matters to the courts of that state. Forsyth v. Hammond, 166 U. S. 506, 17
S. Ct. 665, 41 L. ed. 1095 (1896).
Despite this Supreme Court stand, no cases exactly supporting the West Virginia rule have been found. Some courts, it is true, have upheld similar statutes
on various grounds; but none of them have held that the court is acting as a legislative agent which is not subject to the appellate jurisdiction of a higher state
court, as West Virginia did. In fact, it is usually held that the court. is exercising
judicial power, since it can declare towns incorporated only if it finds that certain
prerequisite facts set out in the statute do exist. Kayser v. Trustees of Bremen, 16
Mo. 88 (1852); State ex rel. Williams v. Second Judicial District Court, 3o Nev. 225,
94 Pac. 70 (1908); Straw v. Harris, 54 Ore. 424, 103 Pac. 777 (19o9). Other courts
have gone further, upholding statutes which authorized the court "in its discretion" to enter the order of incorporation if the requisite statutory facts are found.
To save the statutes, the courts interpreted "in its discretion" to mean merely judicial determination in weighing evidence. Board of Supervisors of Norfolk County
v. Duke, i13 Va. 94, 73 S. E. 456 (1912); Nash v. Fries, 129 Wis. 120, io8 N. W. 21o
(19o6). All these decisions differ from the West Virginia holding in two respects:
(i) Unless the original review was by the highest state court, the decision of the
lower state court, as an exercise of judicial power, could be appealed; (2) the statutes involved limited the courts' discretion more severely than did the West Virginia statute interpreted in the Town of Union Mines case.
Subject to either or both of these limitations, statutes providing for court approval of the extension or contraction of municipal boundaries have generally been
upheld. A statute which provides that a board of county commissioners shall consider and decide whether designated land shall be annexed to a municipality, with
either the landowner or the municipality having the right of appeal to the circuit
court, does not delegate legislative power to the court. Forsythe v. City of Hammond,
142 Ind. 5o5, 41 N. E. 950, 3o L. R. A. 576 (1895). The Indiana Supreme Court has
also upheld a statute giving the courts appellate jurisdiction over orders of municipal councils disannexing land from municipalities, saying that the council in so
doing acts judicially. Livengood v. City of Covington, 194 Ind. 633, 144 N. E. 416
(1924).
Statutes authorizing the court, after determining that the statutory conditions
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charging these functions, the Circuit Court does not act under the judicial branch of the government and is not subject to its supervision,
except by mandamus or prohibition in a proper case, but acts as a part
of the legislative branch of the government under the express authority
of the constitution and is subject to its supervision and control only,
however, by impeachment or amendment or repeal of the law. Hence
its action in discharging these legislative judicial functions, cannot be
reviewed by this Court by a writ of error or other ordinary appellate
12
Although underwrit notwithstanding their judicial character."'
the subject, this
on
standably, the court seemed somewhat confused
3
principle was later followed in several West Virginia cases.' None of
these decisions can, in the judgment of our Supreme Court of Appeals,
as presently constituted, be defended in law or logic, as I shall point
out.
We have also departed from the principle of separation of powers
in matters relating to appeals from decisions of the board of public
have been fulfilled, to annex territory to or disconnect territory from an incorporated city "if justice and equity" require have been upheld as properly delegating
fact-finding to the judiciary; the court has no discretion once it finds such facts.
Town of Edgewater v. Liebhardt, 32 Colo. 307, 76 Pac. 366 (19o4); City of Burlington v. Leebrick, 43 Iowa 252 (1876); Callen v. City of Junction City, 43 Kan. 627, 23
Pac. 652, 7 L. R. A. 736 (1890); City of Wahoo v. Dickinson, 23 Neb. 426, 36 N. W.
813 (1888); In re Fullmer, 33 Utah 43, 92 Pac. 768 (19o7).
The Virginia courts have gone even further in interpreting statutes providing
for court approval of annexation or disannexation of territory. A statute conferring on the circuit judge the power to determine the necessity of expanding a city's
territory and to fix the actual boundaries has been upheld. Henrico County v. City
of Richmond, lo6 Va. 282, 55 S. E. 683 (1906). Likewise, an act providing for disconnection of an area from the corporate limits of a town if the court should determine that it would be in the interest of the majority of the people in the territory proposed to be detached and that the general good of the community would
not be affected is not an unconstitutional delegation. Town of Falls Church v.
County Board of Arlington County, 166 Va. 192, 184 S. E. 459 (1936). This Virginia
view closely approaches that of the West Virginia court in upholding a virtually
uncontrolled delegation of discretion to the judiciary. But the Virginia. rule differs
in that it allows the higher courts of the state to review the circuit judge's determination.
. Although some of these decisions upholding either type of statute seem to strain
to find some limits on judicial discretion in approving or disapproving annexation,
extension, or contraction of municipal corporations, all of them agree in principle
that a delegation of uncontrolled discretion to the court would violate the separation of powers doctrine. And in common they hold that the court function is
judicial in nature, subject to appellate jurisdicti6n of higher state courts. Hence,
even though such statutes are often upheld, the 'holdings seem to disagree 'with
the West Virginia rule which Judge Fox condemns.
12In re Town of Union Mines, 39 W. Va. 179, 182, 19 S. E. 398, 399 (1894).
"Morris v. Taylor, 70 W. Va. 618, 74 S. E. 872 (1912); State v. Harden, 62 W.
Va. 313, 58 S. E. 7'5 (1907); Bloxton v. McWhorter, Judge, 46 W. Va. 32, 32 S. E.
1oo4 (1899); Elder v. Incorporators of Central City, 40 W. Va. 222, 21 S. E. 738 (1895).
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works and other taxing authorities. In the case of Pittsburgh,Cincinnati
and St. Louis Ry. Co. v. Board of Public Works,14 our Court held that
the action of a circuit court in supervising the decision of the board of
public works as to the assessment and valuation of railroad property,
taken under the existing statute, was merely an administrative and not
a judicial act, and that the court acted in such capacity by exercising
powers distinct from those belonging to it as a court or judicial tribunal. At the same time an appeal to the Supreme Court of Appeals
was refused because the circuit court had not exercised its judicial power and was not, therefore, subject to the appellate jurisdiction of the
higher court. 15
"'28 W. Va. 264 (1886).

-A few cases from other jurisdictions provide some support for the West Virginia view that the court in supervising the tax assessment body is performing a
mere administrative duty and so is not subject to the appellate jurisdiction of the
higher state courts. The Supreme Court of Missouri has held that the legislative
power of levying assessments for condemnation benefits may be delegated to judicial
officers and to courts themselves as agents of the taxing authority. Schwab v. City of
St. Louis, 31o Mo. i16, 274 S. W. 1058 (1925). By implication it would seem that no
appeal lies to higher state courts. An early New Jersey opinion, in upholding a
statute requiring the circuit court to hear any objection which might be made to an
assessment and making the court's confirmation essential to the validity of the assessment, apparently considered that the circuit court's determination would be
final, with no right of appeal. Van Riper v. Township of North Plainsfield, 43 N.
J. L. 349 (1881).
Another minority view denies the constitutionality of statutes providing for
any judicial review or approval of tax assessments levied by administrative bodies.
"Correcting an assessment is no more of a judicial act than making the assessment
originally. True it involves determination; but so does almost every political or
executive act. But it is not a judicial determination." Silven v. Board of Commissioners of Osage County, 76 Kan. 687, 92 Pac. 6o4, 6o5, 13 L. R. A. (N.S.) 716, 720
(1907). In another case involving evaluation of railroad property for purposes of tax
assessment, the Kansas court recognized that the power of reviewing such assessment is an incident of the taxing power which cannot constitutionally be delegated
to a judicial body. Auditor of State v. Atchison, T. and S. F. R. R. Co., 6 Kan. 500,
7 Am. Rep. 575 (1870). And in Connecticut it has been held that an act conferring on
the superior court appellate jurisdiction, in a purely advisory capacity, over a tax
assessor's property valuation unconstitutionally attempts to delegate purely administrative duties to the judiciary. Bradley v. City of New Haven, 73 Conn. 646, 48 Ad.
96o (igoi).
The overwhelming weight of authority, however, holds that a state legislature
has power to provide for appeals to the court from tax assessments. Note, L. R. A.
1915B, 875. As the Minnesota Supreme Court has held, "it may be committed to
the court to determine as a quasi judicial question whether the assessing officers
have correctly determined the facts upon which the assessment is made." State ex
rel. Mayor of City of Duluth v. Ensign, 55 Minn. 278, 56 N. W. ioo6, iooS (1893).
Accord: Boston & M. R. R. v. State, 76 N. H. 515, 85 Atl. 616 (1912); Hopper v.
Oklahoma County, 43 Okla. 288, 143 Pac. 4, L. R. A. 19i5B, 875 (1914). Many statutes
providing for such judicial review of administrative tax assessment have been con-
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It may be said also that we have departed from the strict principle
of separation of powers in the handling of appeals or reviews from the
decisions of administrative authorities in our State. The Public Service Commission of West Virginia was established by the Legislature
in 1913. The act creating the commission provided for an appeal from
its decisions to the Supreme Court of Appeals. The question arose as
to whether that provision of the act was constitutional. The Court had
a difficult question to decide, and it settled the matter by making the
following holding in the case of United Fuel Gas Co. v. Public Ser.
Commission:'6 "It seems to us that the character of the proceedings
thus prescribed comport rather with proceedings as upon original process by prohibition or mandamus 17 than upon appellate process.' 8 The
Commission itself is a party, the main defendant, indeed the only defendant specifically recognized by the statute, and whatever judgment
or order this court might make would operate upon its order to suspend or nullify it. The matter in controversy, which we must determine, is whether or not the order of the Commission, within our proper
limitations, is right and just. If it is, so far as we have jurisdiction to inquire, we would decline to interfere; if not, we would suspend the
order, nullify it, and if need be prohibit its enforcement, leaving the
matter open thereafter for further investigation and consideration by
the Commission, if required by the nature of the case."
On this theory the appeal was entertained, but the rule was laid
down that acts of the public service commission would not be set aside
strued without even questioning their constitutionality. Arizona Copper Co. v.
State, 15 Ariz. 9, 137 Pac. 417 (1913); Clay County v. Brown Lumber Co., go Ark.
413, 119 S. W. 251 (igog); Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. v. City of Newton, 97 Iowa
502, 66 N. W. 784 (1896); Chestpeake & Potomac Telephone Co. v. Board of County
Commissioners, 116 Md. 220, 81 Atl. 520 (1911); In re Bankers' Life Ins. Co., 88
Neb. 43, 128 N. W. 661 (191o); Royal Mfg. Co. V. Mayor and Common Council of
City of Rahway, 75 N. J. L. 416, 67 At. 940 (19o7); Warner Iron Co. v. Pace, 89
Tenn. 707, 15 S.W. 1077 (1891). The Alabama court has gone so far as to give tacit
recognition to the constitutionality of a statute providing for a de novo review of
assessment proceedings in the circuit court. State v. Sloss-Sheffield Steel & Iron Co.,
162 Ala. 234, 50 So. 366 (199o).
"73 W. Va. 571, 581, 80 S. E. 931, 935 (1914).
"The use .of these common law methods of judicially reviewing administrative
action is discussed in Kearney, The Problem Of De Novo Judicial Review Of Administrative Action (1939) 14 Notre Dame Lawyer 233, 239- 249; Stason, Methods
Of Judicial Relief From Administrative Action (1938) 24 A. B. A. J. 274; Sherwood,
Mandamus To Review State Administrative Action (1946) 45 Mich. L. Rev. 123.
BCf. Hooper Telephone Co. v. Nebraska Telephone Co., 96 Neb. 245, 147 N.
W. 674 (1914), where it was held that a statute providing for appeal from decisions
of the State Railway Commission directly to the state supreme court did confer appellate jurisdiction on the court.
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unless "'(i) beyond the power which it could constitutionally exercise; or (2) beyond its statutory power; or (3) based upon a mistake
of law.' "19
"73 W.
This is
ministrative
bertsworth,

Va. 571, 583, 8o S. E. 931, 936 (1954).
substantially the federal view as to the scope of judicial review of adaction, except as to judicial review of administrative rate-making. AlJudicial Review of Administrative Action by the Federal Supreme

Court (1921) 35 Harv L. Rev. 127, 151. The United States Supreme Court has held

that "where the decision of questions of fact is committed by Congress to the judgment and discretion of the head of a department, his decision thereon is conclusive; and ... even upon mixed questions of law and fact, or of law alone, his action
will carry with it a strong presumption of its correctness, and the courts will not ordinarily review it ....

Bates & Guild Co. v. Payne, 194 U. S. 106, 109-110, 24 S.

Ct. 595, 597, 48 L. ed. 894, 895 (19o4). This federal view may have been slightly modified by the Federal Administrative Procedure Act. The act allows the reviewing court
to set aside agency action if it is "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or
otherwise not in accordance with law." In certain types of cases the court can set
aside the agency's findings if "unsupported by substantial evidence," and can always set aside orders "unwarranted by the facts to the extent that the facts are
subject to trial de novo by the reviewing court." Federal Administrative Procedure
Act. 6o Stat. 237, 243 (1946), 5 U. S. C. A. § soo9e (Supp. 1947).
The Supreme Court has, however, seen fit to make an exception to this usual
presumption of correctness in reviewing rate-making orders of administrative bodies.
Is is the general rule that a legislature cannot delegate to the courts the power to
fix rates in the first instance, but the court does have power to decide whether the
rates as fixed by the Public Service Commission or by the corporation itself are unreasonable. 16 C. J. S., Constitutional Law § 139g; Note (19o8) 9 Ann. Cas. 823. In
the federal courts, the rule is that if confiscation is alleged in a rate-making controversy, the court on review must look into the evidence de novo, deciding for itself the propriety of the rate. Ohio Valley Water Vo. v. Ben Avon Borough, 253
U. S. 287, 40 S. Ct. 527, 64 L. ed. 9o8 (192o). This decision has been severely criticized as violative of the theory of separation of governmental powers and entirely repugnant to the Supreme Court's tendency to limit the scope of judicial review of
administrative action. Kearney, The Problem of De Novo Judicial Review of Administrative Action (1939) 14 Notre Dame Lawyer 233, 256-257; Albertsworth, Judicial Review of Administrative Action by the Federal Supreme Court (1921) 35
Harv. L. Rev. 127; and see articles cited in Note (1936) 5o Harv. L. Rev. 78, 82, n.
30. Yet the opinion was re-examined and reaffirmed in St. Joseph Stock Yards Co.
v. United States, 298 U. S. 38, 56 S. Ct. 720, 8o L. ed. 1033 (1936). The rule has since

been somewhat relaxed. Where a water company sought review of the commission's
determination in a rate case by the limited statutory remedy of certiorari, it waived
its equitable remedy which would have entitled it to the court's independent judgment on both the law and the facts. People ex rel. Consolidated Water Co. of Utica
v. Maltbie, 303 U. S. 158, 58 S. Ct. 5o6, 82 L. ed. 489 (1937). The question of reasonableness of rates fixed by a commission may be submitted to a jury, and this satisfies the requirements of an independent judicial review. United Gas Public Service Co. v. Texas, 303 U. S. 123, 58 S. Ct. 483, 82 L. ed. 490 (1937).

To be consistent with these decisions, it would seem that the state courts would
uphold statutes providing for de novo judicial review of administrative rate-making
findings as declaratory of the law as laid down by the Supreme Court of the United
States. And yet such statutes are usually held unconstitutional. In Alabama, a court
on review can set aside a rate-making order of the Public Service Commission only
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On the basis of this decision the legislature of our state has frequently provided for appeals to the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia, in matters originating in our Compensation Department, Unemployment. Compensation Department, State Board of Health, Department of Agriculture and many others. In support of this theory,
there has recently grown up the idea that all of these administrative
bodies possess what is termed "quasi judicial power." The present
situation in West Virginia, with respect to appeals to the Supreme
Court of Appeals in matters of administrative law, is clearly stated in
State v. Huber:20 "More recently, on the theory of the exercise of quasi
judicial power by administrative agencies, the practice of permitting
appeals or writs of error from the findings of administrative officials,
boards and commissions is clearly recognized by our decisions. [Citing
cases] 21 All of these cases recognize the distinction between 'judicial
power' and 'quasi judicial power.' Whether there is a justification for
the use of the latter term, and whether in lieu of permitting 'appeals
and writs of error to the courts on that theory, we should resort to the
old system under which, generally speaking, direct proceedings in
court were required to set aside, or question, the actions of administrative boards and commissions, need not be decided. Apparently the law
if it is so unreasonable as to be confiscatory; to allow the court, in its own discretion
to set new rates "is to have the court substitute its judgment in a legislative matter for that of the commission." City of Birmingham v. Southern Bell Telephone &
Telegraph Co., 234 Ala. 526, 176 So. 301, 307 (1937). In Maryland, even in rate-making cases, the court will not disturb the order of the commission except upon clear
and satisfactory evidence that it is unreasonable or unlawful; it will not substitute
its independent examination of the facts for that of the commission to which the
carrying out.of the state policy has been delegated. West v. United Rys. & Electric
Co. of Baltimore, 155 Md. 572, 142, Ad. 870 (1928); Oppenheimer, Administrative
Law In Maryland (1938) 2 Md. L. Rev. 185, 209-21o. And see Note (1939) 24 Corn.
L. Q. 235, 238, n. 18, for cases and statutes from other jurisdictions.
For a discussion of do novo judicial review in types of cases other than those involving rate-making, see note 23,, infra.
^04o S. E. (2d) 11, 24 (W. Va. 1946).
Another excellent and exhaustive case discourse on the doctrine of separation
of powers, closely parallelling the views of the Huber case, is contained in State ex
rel. Young v. Duval County, 76 Fla. 18o, 79 So. 692 (1918). The different holdings in
the two cases can be traced to the difference in the applicable state constitutions
and in the subject matter of the two cases.
The problem of court review of beer license revocation, with which the Huber
case deals, is fully treated in note 31, infra.
mSpurdone v. Shaw, Judge, 114 W. Va. 1g1, 171 S. E. 411 (1933); State ex rel.
Board of Education v. Martin, 112 W. Va. 174, 163 S.E. 850 (1932); Quesenberry v.
State Road Commission, 1o3 W. Va. 714, 138 S.E. 362 (1927); Reynolds Taxi Co. v.
Hudson, Judge, 1o3 W. Va. 173, 136 S. E. 833 (1927); Ellis v. State Road Commission, ioo W. Va. 531, 131 S. E. 7 (1925).
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is settled in favor of the use of the appeal method, on the theory that
duly constituted administrative boards and commissions do sometimes
exercise quasi judicial power, and that, on that theory, there can be
brought into play what is called judicial power."
But in later years our courts have attempted to regain some lost
ground. Our legislature in 1929 passed a rather comprehensive water
power bill. 22 It made the Governor of the state a member of the Public

Service Commission, and authorized the commission to investigate proposed development of water power, to hold hearings, etc. The act also
provided for an appeal as a matter of right, by any party of record,
from a decision of the commission granting or refusing to grant a license, to the Circuit Court of Kanawha County, where the seat of the
State Government is located, with trial on the appeal de novo 23 on the
original record before the commission and upon any additional evidence offered by any party in interest. An appeal was provided for from
the circuit court to the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia. The
constitutionality of this act was raised in a proper proceeding, which
reached the Supreme Court of Appeals in the case of Hodges v. Public
Service Commission.24 The Court held that "The legislature cannot
commit to the judiciary powers which are primarily legislative." 25 The
2W. Va. Stat. (1929) c. 58.
2In a case testing an Arkansas statute which provided for a de novo hearing
in the Circuit Court of Appeals from a rate-making order of the municipal council,
it was held that the power to fix rates for the future is legislative and cannot validly
be delegated to the judiciary in the guise of appellate jurisdiction. Helena Water
Co. v. City of Helena, 277 Fed. 66 (E. D. Ark. 1921). But see note 19, supra, for a
discussion of review of rate-making orders by the Supreme Court of the United
States.
In Illinois it has been held that a statutory provision for a de novo review by
the circuit court of the refusal of an old age compensation award by the State Department of Public Welfare was an unconstitutional attempt to delegate executive
power to the judiciary. Borreson v. Department of Public Welfare, 368 Ill. 425,
14 N. E. (2d) 485 (1938). This holding has, however, been severely criticised. Notes
(1939) 37 Mich. L. Rev. 639; (1940) 19 Neb. L. Bul. 51.
Note 31, infra, discusses several cases dealing with de novo judicial review of administrative orders revoking liquor and beer licenses.
"1io W. Va. 649, 159 S. E. 834 (1931). See Davis, Judicial Review of Administrative Action In West Virginia-A Study In Separation of Powers (1938) 44 W. Va.
L. Q. 27o; Donley, The Hodges Case And Beyond (1939) 45 W. Va. L. Q. 291; Davis, A Final Word On The Doctrine Of The Hodges Case (1939) 45 W. Va. L. Q.
316.
.io W. Va. 649, 159 S. E. 834 (1931).
The Supreme Court of the United States has said that when "a state constitution sees fit to unite legislative and judicial powers in a single hand, there is nothing to hinder so far as the Constitution of the United States is concerned." Prentis
v. Atlantic Coast Line Co., 211 U. S. 210, 225, 29 S. Ct. 67, 69, 53 L. ed. 150, 158 (19o8).
a
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decision of the court was based upon Article V of our Constitution
which I have quoted. Section i, of Article VIII of our Constitution
provides that: "The judicial power of the State shall be vested in a supreme court of appeals, in circuit courts and the judges thereof, in such
inferior tribunals as are herein authorized and in justices of the peace."
Section 12 of Article VIII, conferring jurisdiction on circuit courts,
after specifically defining its jurisdiction, provides: "They shall also
have such other jurisdiction, whether supervisory, original, appellate
or concurrent, as is or may be prescribed by law." This latter provision
furnished basis for the contention that the legislature was not limited
in its power to confer jurisdiction on courts, but the Hodges case rejects that contention by saying that: "Prior to the words 'other jurisdiction,' section 12 mentions certain proceedings and cases in which
circuit courts shall have jurisdiction, which the context clearly shows
is judicialjurisdiction. No intimation is given there or elsewhere that
circuit courts may assume the duties of another department, either as
subordinates or as supervisors. We cannot agree that, after delimiting
the three departments of the government so precisely, the framers then
meant by the words 'other jurisdiction' to confer on circuit courts departmental authority in or over the other two departments. We adopt
the natural inference that the 'other jurisdiction' is jurisdiction essentially juridical (then or thereafter prescribed by law) over proceedings not named in the section." 26 As the opinion of Judge Hatcher in
this case clearly states, to adopt any other theory than that the legislature meant to limit jurisdiction of courts to matters judicial in their
Congress itself has delegated purely administrative duties to the courts of the
District of Columbia in its role as legislature for the District, and this delegation has
been upheld by the Supreme Court. Congress can empower the courts of the district
to review and amend all valuations, rates, and regulations established by the Public
Utilities Commission; in so doing, the court is exercising purely legislative power and
provision for appeal to the United States Supreme Court is void. Keller v. Potomac
Electric Power Co., 261 U. S.428, 43 S. Ct. 445, 67 L. ed. 731 (1923). Again in 193o, the

Supreme Court, in construing the review provisions of the Radio Act of 1927, held
that the proceeding in the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia to review
the Radio Commission's action in issuance of a license was purely administrative and
not a case or controversy subject to review in the Supreme Court under the Judiciary
Article of the Federal Constitution. Federal Radio Commission v. General Electric
Co., 281 U. S. 464, 50 S. Ct. 389, 74 L. ed. 969 ,193o).
The Supreme Court of Florida, in upholding a statute authorizing curcuit
court review and approval of toll bridge rates, decided that a legislature may delegate to the courts the performance of administrative functions when the state constitution does not forbid. State ex rel. Young v. Duval County, 76 Fla. 18o, 79 So.
692 (1918).
2iio W. Va. 649, 654, 159 S. E. 834, 836 (1931).
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character would emasculate and render ineffective the whole theory
of separation of powers so far as it relates to the judiciary.
The West Virginia Court has also had occasion to review the propriety of judicial supervision of land tax sales as conducted by an administrative agency. In 1863 what is now West Virginia was generally
undeveloped, particularly the southern portion thereof. Millions of
acres of land had been granted to different people, without much concern as to where it was located or with whom it interfered. The litigation over these grants has not yet ended. When our first Constitution
was framed, there was adopted a system by which lands could be forfeited for the nonpayment of taxes, and legislation was soon enacted under which land could be returned delinquent for the nonpayment of
taxes, sold by the sheriff, and purchased, either by the State or by individuals, with reasonable time to redeem. When the period of development came along, it was necessary to settle these conflicting titles, and
they were generally settled through tax sales, or through adverse possession. Under the Constitution of 1872, and the statutes enacted thereunder, it was held in the case of McClure v. Maitland27 that a proceeding to sell lands forfeited to the State, or purchased by it for the nonpayment of taxes, was not a judicial proceeding, and that the former owner
was not a necessary party thereto. Subsequently, in 1882, the legislature
enacted a law28 under which proceedings for the sale of land forfeited to
the state, or purchased by it for the nonpayment of taxes, became a judicial proceeding, in which the former owner was required to be made
a party, the case then proceeding as an ordinary chancery suit in the
circuit court.
In 1941, in an effort to clear up the tax status of thousands of tracts
of land in West Virginia, title to which had vested in the state during
the depression, the legislature passed an act by which it went back to
the theory of McClure v. Maitland and made a proceeding for the sale
of lands an administrative one, but, at the same time, required the circuit courts of the state to act as the agency through which these lands
could be sold. In Sims v. Fisher,29 the Supreme Court of West Virginia
held: "Article 4, Chapter 1 17, Acts of the Legislature 1941, relating to

the sale of lands for the benefit of the school fund, so far as it attempts
to require of circuit courts, and this Court, the performance of administrative and non-judicial functions, is unconstitutional." In that case
the question of the separation of powers is discussed at length.
724 W. Va. 561 (1884).
1W. Va. Stat. (1882) c. 13o, § 27.
9125 W. Va. 512, 25 S. E. (2d) 216, 217 (1943).
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Again the legislature of Vest Virginia, in seeking to correct what
it thought was an evil connected with the sale of non-intoxicating beer,
enacted a law at its 1945 session3 ° in which it conferred upon circuit
courts of the several counties of the state the power to revoke the licenses of persons engaged in the business of selling non-intoxicating
beer in their respective circuits, upon petition, proof and due hearing.
The Supreme Court of West Virginia, on its own motion, declared
this act unconstitutional, in so far as it conferred upon circuit courts
jurisdiction to pass upon questions relating to revocation of the licenses. This holding was based on the general theory that the licensing, revocation of licenses, and sale of non-intoxicating beer was a
purely administrative function of the legislature, with which circuit
courts should have nothing to do, unless the legislative power was
exercised in an illegal, arbitrary or unconstitutional manner, creating
a situation which would call for the intervention of judicial power.3 1
-W. Va. Stat. (1945) c. 15, art. 16.
"nState v. Huber, 40 S. E. (2d) ii (W. Va. 1946).

It is undoubtedly the general rule that "the revocation of a liquor license is an
administrative and not a judicial proceeding and that accordingly no appeal lies
in the absence of a statute specifically conferring the right." Note, Ann. Cas. 191 7 A,
1024. State ex rel. City of Puyallup v. Superior Court of Pierce County, 5o Wash. 650,
97 Pac. 778 (1908); State ex rel. City of Aberdeen v. Superior Court of Chehalis
County, 44 Wash. 526, 87 Pac. 88 (igo6).
Such statutes are quite common. "The object is not punishment, but the revocation of a privilege. The power to license and to cancel licenses being vested in the
legislature, the mode and manner in which it shall be done rests in its discretion."
Black, Intoxicating Liquors (1892) 237.
In Utah, a statute very similar to that involved in the Huber case was upheld
as validly conferring on the district court the power to order city councils to revoke liquor licenses, the supreme court holding that the lower court was acting as
an administrative agent of the state in the exercise of state police powers, with no
right of appeal to a higher court. In re Grant, 44 Utah 386, 140 Pac. 226, Ann Cas.
19i 7A, 1o9 (1914).

Usually the statute contetmplates judicial review of ordinary scope. In some
cases the legislature has provided for de novo judicial review of a commission's
revocation of liquor licenses. The courts have interpreted such statutes to allow
reversal of the commission's order of revocation only if it ws arbitrary or illegal.
To interpret them as allowing an independent finding on the law and the facts
by the court would render them unconstitutional as invalidly delegating legislative
authority to the judiciary. Cripps v. Liquor Control Commission, i3o Conn. 693,
37 A (2d) 227 (1944); De Mond v. Liquor Control Commission, 129 Conn. 642, 30
A. (2d) 547 (1943); Bradley v. Texas Liquor Control Board, io8 S. W. (2d) 300 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1937). For criticism of the latter case and discussion of other Texas cases,
see Note (1938) 16 Tex. L. Rev. 400.
Iq Kentucky, where the statute provides for appeal from an administrative order revoking a liquor license to the circuit court and then to the court of appeals,
it is held that the courts will not interfere with the action of the license board unless it abuses the discretion vested in it by law. Hays v. City of Louisville, 145 Ky.
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Only a short time ago, after the decisions of Sims v. Fisher3 2 and
State v. Huber,33 some people who were opposed to the incorporation
of a small town near the City of Charleston asked the Supreme Court
of Appeals to declare unconstitutional and invalid the act which empowered circuit courts to authorize the incorporation of towns of a
population of two thousand or less. The Court 34 conceded that the
principle announced in the cases of Sims v. Fisher and State v. Huber
would compel a holding that the act should have been held unconstitutional in the beginning. However, in view of the fact that numerous
decisions of the Court had upheld the constitutionality of the act,
that as a matter of common knowledge many towns throughout the
state had been incorporated by circuit courts on the strength of the
case of In Re Town of Union Mines, 35 which sustained the statute,

and that in all probability all of these towns had either incurred obligations, granted franchises, or were engaged in proprietary municipal
enterprises of different characters, the Court decided, on the general
theory of stare decisis, that it would not be justified in overruling that
case and the cases which followed. The position taken by the Court
was that it could not make its decision prospective only,3 6 and that the
125, 140 S. W. 47 (191; Pezold Bios. v. City of Louisville, 140 Ky. 784, 131 S. W.
802 (191o).

This latter view, which is in accord with the holding of the Huber case, is much
like that taken by the federal courts in interpreting the National Prohibition Act.
The court, in reviewing the revocation by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue
of a druggist's permit to sell prescription whiskey, could reverse the Commissioner's
order only if it was based on an error of law, or was wholly unsupported by the
evidence, or was clearly arbitrary. Elsinore Perfume Co., Inc. v. Campbell, 31 F. (2d)
235 (C. C. A. 2d, 1929), rev'g 26 F. (2d) 745 (E. D. N. Y. 1928), cert denied 279 U. S.
870, 49 S. Ct. 512, 73 L. ed. ioo6 (1929); Qualtop Beverages, Inc. v. McCampbell, 31
F. (2d) 260 (C. C. A. 2d, 1929).
212 5 W. Va. 512, 25 S. E. (2d) 216 (1943),
334o S. E. (2d) 51 (W. Va. 1946).
3In re Proposal To Incorporate Town of Chesapeake, 45 S. E. (2d) n13 (W. Va.
1947).
*39 W. Va. 179, 19 S. E. 398 (1894). See discussion in text at note lo.
"It is the general rule that an unconstitutional statute is not a law at all and
is as void as if never passed. Chicago, Indianapolis & Louisville Railway Company v.
Hackett, 228 U. S. 559, 33 S. Ct. 581, 57 L. ed. 966 (1913); Norton v. Shelby County,
x18 U. S. 425, 6 S. Ct. 1121, 3o L. ed. 178 (1886); Cooley, Constitutional Limitations
( 5 th ed. 1883) 224; 11 Am. Jur., Constitutional Law § 148. Further, it is generally
agreed that a decision of a court of supreme jurisdiction overruling a former decision is retrospective in its operation, striking down the former decision from the
time it was first entered. People ex rel. Rice v. Graves, 242 App. Div. 128, 273 N. Y.
Supp. 582 (1934), aff'd 27o N. Y. 948, 2oo N. E. 288 (1936), cert. denied 298 U. S. 683,
56 S. Ct. 953, 8o L.ed.14o3 (1936); 14 Am. Jur., Courts § 13o; Note (1946) 4 Wash. and
Lee L. Rev. 77. But there is overwhelming authority that a court in announcing its
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decision can expressly provide whether it is to operate retrospectively as normally
or prospectively only, either by an express saving clause protecting all rights accrued under the previous decision or otherwise. Justice Cardozo expressed this
view as follows: "A state in defining the limits of adherence to precedent may make
a choice for itself between the principle of forward operation and that of relation
backward. It may say that decisions of its highest court, though later overruled, are
law none the less for intermediate transactions." Great Northern Railway Co. v.
Sunburst Oil 8= Refining Co., 287 U. S. 358, 364, 53 S. Ct. 145, 148, 77 L. ed. 360,
366, 85 A. L. R. 254, 26o (1932). Accord: Payne v. City of Covington, 276 Ky. 38o, 123
S. W. (2d) io45 (1938); Barker v. St. Louis County, 340 Mo. 986, 104 S. W. (2d) 371
(1937); Gibson v. Phillips University, 195 Okla. 456, 158 P. (2d) goi (1945); 21 C. J.
S., Courts §194a; Note (1946) 4 Wash. and Lee L. Rev. 77; Note (1933) 85 A. L. R. 262.
It is somewhat difficult to understand the West Virginia court's position on
this doctrine of prospective operation of its judgments, as expressed in the Town
of Chesapeake case. The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia was the originator of the minority doctrine that a court judgment construing a statute as unconstitutional is not a judgment against the statute, voiding it ab initio for all purposes, but is merely an interpretation of the statute as applied in the particular
case then before the court. Shepherd v. Wheeling, 3o W. Va. 479, 4 S. E. 635 (1887).
And on the question of judicial impairment of the obligation of contract, the same
court has said: "... when former decisions are overruled they are considered as never
having been the law, but that for a time they obscure the true and sound law; but
this rule is subject to one exception, based on decisions of the courts; that is, that
where there is a statute, and a decision of the highest court construing it, and a
contract is made which is good under that statute, so construed, no subsequent contrary decision can affect such prior contract...." Falconer v. Simmons, 51 W. Va.
172, 41 S. E. 193 (19o2) [italics supplied]. It would seem that these two holdings together, if presented to the court, would be proper precedent for a determination
that the statute authorizing judicial approval of municipal incorporation is unconstitutional without thereby invalidating all incorporation contracts previously
entered into on the faith of the statute as then construed and all contracts entered
into with municipal corporations so formed. This could be done most effectively,
in order to bar litigation, by an overruling decision with a clause expressly saving
all rights accrued under the statute and providing for prospective operation only of
the overruling decision. On the strength of Falconer v. Simmons, no contract right
secured while the statute was adjudged valid could be impaired by an overruling decision even though no such saving clause were included in overruling the previous
construction.
This latter view is almost universally supported. "After a statute has been
settled by judicial construction, the construction becomes, so far as contract rights
acquired under it are concerned, as much a part of the statute as the text itself; and
a change of decision is to all intents and purposes the same in its effect on contracts
as an amendment of the law by means of a legislative enactment." Douglass v.
County of Pike, loi U. S. 677, 687, 25 L. ed. 968, 971 (1879). See also Taylor v. Ypsilanti, 1o5 U. S. 60, 26 L. ed. ioo8 (1882); Olcott v. The Supervisors, 16 Wall. 678, 21
L. ed. 382 (1873); Gelpecke v. City of Dubuque, i Wall. 175, 17 L. ed. 520 (1864);
Haskett v. Mazey, 134 Ind. 182, 33 N. E. 358, 19 L. R. A. 379 (1893); Eberle v.
Koplar, 85 S. W. (2d) 919 (Mo. 1935); Wilkinson v. Wallace, 192 N. C. 156, 134 S. E.
401 (1926); Schramm v. Steel, 97 Wash. 3o9, 166 Pac. 634 (1917); 14 Am. Jur., Coiurts
§13o; 21 C. J. S., Courts §'194b; Notes (1937) 16 Ore. L. Rev. 397; (1928) 4 Wis. L.
Rev. 485; Ann. Cas. 1915C, 578; (191o) 23 L. R. A. (N.s.) 5oo; (1907) 5 L. R. A. (N.S.)
860, 861.
Although the Supreme Court of the United States refuses to permit a state
court thus to impair the obligations of a contract by a decision overruling a prior
construction of a statute, it does so only after acquiring jurisdiction on some grounds
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effect of holding the act unconstitutional and void from the beginning
would be to create grave disturbances in the fiscal affairs of hundreds
of municipalities in the state. But the Court pointed out an easy way
by which the matter could be handled by the legislature, by an act
prospective in its nature.
The theory of separation of powers encounters its greatest difficulty
in these days when so many disputes are settled through the processes
of administrative law. I am not one of those who rail against administrative law. I think there is a place for it, but I think provision should
always be made whereby, 'in some way, parties aggrieved may have the
right of resort to the courts. Whether there is logic in the proposition,
in West Virginia we have reached the point where this question does
not any longer trouble us. We treat these administrative bodies as
quasi judicial in their nature, and in deference to the legislative mandate and under some supposed powers of original jurisdiction, we hear
matters of administrative law, confining ourselves, however, to the
principles laid down in the case of United Fuel Gas Co. v. Public Service Commission,37 heretofore mentioned. This case, in effect, confines
us to the legal and judicial questions involved, and leaves to the administrative agency all questions of fact and discretion, unless that discretion is abused and the case is decided against overwhelming proof.
In other words, we pass upon cases where a court would have been
justified in taking jurisdiction had the right of appeal not been provided for. In practice we probably go farther than that, and often the
case is decided in the same manner that we decide other types of cases.
However, there is one thing that should be sternly stressed: when
the legislature imposes upon courts the responsibility, and perhaps
the duty, to pass upon these questions growing out of administrative
law, it cannot expect courts to approve or to uphold acts and conduct
other than the unconstitutionality of such impairment. It is a fundamental error
"that this court can, as an appellate tribunal, reverse the decision of a State court,
because that court may hold a contract to be void which this court might hold to
be valid." Railroad Co. v. Rock, 4 Wall. 177, 18 L. ed. 381 (1867). Despite this Supreme Court holding, only one other state appears to accept the view that West
Virginia contends for in the Town of Chesapeake case. The Texas court has held
that a later decision overruling a former one which had held a statute valid does not
impair the obligation of a contract entered into on the faith of the earlier construction for the reason that a decision of a court is not in fact a law. Storrie v. Cortes,
go Tex. 283, 38 S. W. 154, 35 L. R. A. 666 (1896). And at least one writer has condemned the doctrine of prospective operation of judicial decisions, classifying the
doctrine as judicial legislation. Von Moschzisker, Stare Decisis In Courts Of Last
Resort (1924) 37 Harv. L. Rev. 409, 426- 427.
3773 W. Va. 571, 80 S. E. 931 (1914).

1948]

SEPARATION OF POWERS

on the part of administrative officers which do not conform to the
sound principles by which disputes are heard and determined in courts
of justice. We have heard much in these later days of arbitrary acts and
conduct on the part of administrative officers, commissions, special
masters, and trial examiners. If courts are to be expected to pass upon
these questions of administrative law, they should insist upon the
right to do so without control by legislative authority. There is no
reason why a person involved in a dispute requiring the use of the
provisions of administrative law should not have his case tried upon
the general principles of right and justice which govern the trial of
cases in courts of justice. Any rule or system which does not guarantee
to interested persons the right to such trial departs in spirit, if not in
actual effect, from what we call due process of law. In my judgment,
judicial power, represented by the duly established courts of the land,
should, as a part of its high duty to State and Nation, see to it that,
whether before a board or commission or whether in the courts of last
resort, there be dealt out that form of equal and exact justice, which
every court of justice seeks to adjudge.
Of course, we know that the urgencies of modern times call for
speed in the settlement of disputes which naturally lend themselves
to administrative law, and sometimes the strict rules of evidence are
necessarily waived. But the foundation upon which the settlement of
all disputes rests, that of justice to those interested therein, should at
all times be maintained. One of the great tasks confronting the judiciary of this country at the present time is that of bringing into line with
established judicial principles-the outgrowth of centuries of trial and
error-the multitudinous disputes which have arisen from the marvelous advances in the economic and mechanical developments of
the age.
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